This paper studies the e¤ect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tari¤s endogenously. The e¤ect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow di¤erentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a signi…cant e¤ect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.
Introduction
In the political economy literature a growing number of studies view trade policy as an endogenous outcome of lobbying activity by special interest groups. Several authors (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000) have con…rmed that lobbying intensity by domestic …rms is one of the main determinants of the cross-industry pattern of protection. More recently, Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) also …nd that lobbying by foreign …rms for trade barriers reduction has a signi…cant e¤ect on the structure of tari¤s across industries. However, if a country is a member of a regional free trade agreement (FTA) and foreign …rms can a¤ect the government's decision regarding trade policy, it becomes necessary to distinguish foreign lobbying from within and outside of the FTA. Organized foreign interests with preferential market access will lobby for more protection against other foreign …rms, and the trade agreement may become more protectionist with a strong lobby group in a prospective FTA partner country. Active foreign lobbying under the preferential trade agreement may not only lead to an increase in trade barriers, but also make welfare-reducing trade agreements politically feasible.
In this paper I analyze the e¤ect of foreign lobbying on domestic trade policy when the country is a member of a preferential trade agreement using Canadian post-NAFTA trade data. Given the relative size of the US and Canadian economies, the e¤ect of US lobbying in Canada will be considerably larger than the e¤ect of Canadian lobbying in the US. Therefore, focusing on Canadian data is particularly advantageous for the empirical analysis of foreign lobbying under the FTA. This analysis reveals two main results. First, the activity of foreign lobbyists in Canada is a signi…cant determinant of the Canadian trade policy, and sectors in which foreign …rms without preferential market access are politically organized tend to receive less protection. This result supports the previous …nding by Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) for the US. Second, NAFTA has an important e¤ect on the structure of foreign lobbies. The data con…rm that foreign …rms with preferential market access lobby for more protection just as domestic …rms do. This result implies that an FTA with an active foreign lobby may become more protectionist and, under certain conditions, lead to a welfare reduction. This paper is the …rst one that analyzes from theoretical and empirical points of view the e¤ect of foreign lobbying on domestic trade policy in the presence of an FTA. The political economy model presented in this paper incorporates a monopolistically competitive market structure into the Grossman and Helpman (1994) 'protection for sale 'setup (henceforth GH) to analyze the role of foreign lobbying in the making of national trade policy. The framework is further extended by allowing for two types of foreign interest groups, namely, lobbying groups formed by …rms from an FTA partner country and by …rms from countries outside of the FTA, aggregated into the rest of the world (ROW). This di¤erentiation of foreign lobbies by market access is important in the presence of an FTA. When two countries join a regional trade agreement, granting zero import tari¤s to each other, …rms from countries with preferential market access will lobby for more protection under the FTA to lock it from competition from the ROW …rms, while …rms from outside of the FTA will continue to lobby for trade liberalization. 1 This results in heterogeneity of foreign lobbying under the FTA with respect to their lobbying objectives, and implies that in a world where almost every country is a part of at least one FTA, a complete theory of the e¤ect of foreign lobbing on the national trade system should take this heterogeneity into account.
The model of foreign lobbying in the presence of the FTA is tested using Canadian post-NAFTA trade data. The empirical analysis suggests a strong and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of domestic and foreign lobbying on Canadian trade policy, and points to the importance of distinguishing partner country lobbying from ROW lobbying. Using data on lobbying intensity by sector and by country of origin, this paper veri…es that the main predictions of the model are consistent with the data. First, the importance of both partner country and ROW foreign lobbying under the FTA is con…rmed in the Canadian data: while the presence of the organized domestic lobbying group raises industry import tari¤ by 3-5% relative to the unorganized industry, organized partner country lobbying would raise it by 1-2%, and foreign lobbying from the ROW would lower it by 2-3%. These results are economically meaningful and con…rm the main prediction of the model that foreign …rms with preferential market access behave just as domestic …rms do, which introduces an additional distortion in the policy making process.
Second, the empirical evidence shows that even politically unorganized sectors receive a positive level of protection from the government of 2-4 percentage points of the ad-valorem tari¤, providing support for the imperfectly competitive structure of the model. Additionally, an important contribution of this work to the political economy literature of trade is its determination of more plausible values for the government's valuation of political contributions. In this paper, the government is estimated to value political contributions more than national welfare, which is in sharp contrast with previous tests of the benchmark GH speci…cation in which governments were found to 1 Two considerations should be taken into account when partner country lobbying for more protection is considered.
First, the WTO tari¤ binding constrains the lobbying opportunities by the partner country …rms; however, they may still play an important role in the future and impede multilateral trade liberalization in those sectors. Second, the WTO precludes countries from raising their tari¤s once the FTA is signed. Yet foreign lobbies may oppose further tari¤ reduction as described above and use anti-dumping and countervailing measures to gain protection. have stronger preferences for welfare (Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) ). This result explains why relatively small political contributions may have strong policy e¤ects.
My empirical results provide new perspective on the e¤ect of regional trade blocks on trade policies of member countries. Most of the literature on endogenous trade policy concludes that a country is more likely to reduce its external tari¤ when it enters an FTA. Richardson (1993) , Bagwell and Staiger (1997) , Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti (2004) , Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004) show that a welfare-maximizing government will lower external import tari¤s once an FTA is formed. By doing this, the government restores part of the tari¤ revenue lost due to the shift in import demand from the ROW to the partner country …rms. Ornelas (2005a,b) examined the political economy of an FTA without foreign lobbying using an oligopolistic market structure in the GH model. He shows that FTA formation weakens the lobbying power of domestic …rms because the elimination of tari¤s between FTA member countries shifts part of the tari¤ rent from domestic …rms towards …rms from a partner country. Therefore, political economy factors lower the potential bene…t from protection for home country …rms, thus reinforcing the welfare maximization considerations identi…ed by Bagwell and Staiger (1997) and reducing the government's incentives for protection. The model in this paper, however, allows for cross-border lobbying activity, which lessens the e¤ect introduced by Ornelas (2005a,b) since the reduction in political activity by domestic …rms is coupled with an increase in contributions for protection by the FTA partner country …rms. As a result, in the presence of foreign lobbying a country may in fact raise external tari¤s under the FTA when strong lobbying by an FTA partner country puts extra pressure on the government for higher trade barriers.
Activities of foreign interest groups in national policy-making have received a growing attention in the political economy literature. Many scholars have evaluated the intensity of foreign lobbying in the US and argue that it has high potential for policy in ‡uence. Mitchell (1995) found that foreign a¢ liates in the US contributed 5.6% of total corporate political contributions in 1987-88, and 42% of them hired professional lobbyists to promote their interests in Washington. Hansen and Mitchell (2000) claim that, although foreign corporations make lower political contributions than domestic ones due to the existing legal restrictions, they are just as intensive as domestic corporations with respect to lobbying activity and lobbying expenditures. Choate (1991) presents a list of over 200 former US o¢ cials (including members of the president's administration) who lobbied for the interests of foreign corporations, along with the list of the foreign clients they represent and the amounts paid.
While it has been argued that foreign corporations are quite in ‡uential in US politics, very little research has been done on their e¤ect on trade policy outcomes. In their pioneering work, Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) demonstrate that foreign agents lobbying expenditure in the US is even greater than political contributions by domestic corporations, and that the elasticity of the US import tari¤ with respect to foreign lobbying is almost as big as with respect to the domestic one. Their paper was the …rst to show that foreign lobbying is an important factor in the formation of national trade policy and argue that foreign lobbying may be bene…cial to the country's trade policy as a counter-pressure to domestic interests, helping to reduce distortional trade barriers. In contrast, my paper suggests that the above argument is invalid in the presence of preferential trade agreements, when …rms from a partner country prefer to maintain high discriminatory tari¤s for third-country imports. Since most of the countries are members of at least one preferential trade agreement, this paper demonstrates that cross-border lobbying may stimulate more protectionist trade policies of FTAs and disrupt multilateral trade liberalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some evidence on the lobbying activities of foreign …rms in Canada. Section 3 introduces the modi…ed GH version of the model that allows imperfectly competitive market structure and two groups of foreign lobbies, and motivates the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 explains the estimation procedure. Results are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
The role of foreign lobbies in Canada
To motivate the presence of foreign lobbying in the theoretical model and empirical speci…cation, we need to discuss the main channels of foreign lobbying activity in Canada and its relative strength as compared to domestic lobbying.
Concerns about foreign in ‡uence on Canadian policy and the necessity of special regulation emerged after WWII. The main law that regulates the activity of domestic and foreign lobbyists in Canada is the Canada Elections Act, introduced in 1960. This law regulates the amount of political contributions by Canadian nationals to political parties that could be used for political advertisement campaigns. It also explicitly bans the use of political contributions from foreigners (s.217): "No person or party shall accept or use contributions from a person who is not a Canadian citizen . . . , corporation or association that does not carry on business in Canada, foreign political party, or foreign government." However, this law su¤ered from a lack of transparency in the lobbying process. On September 9, 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney announced his intention to introduce a legislation to ensure that "persons, who are approached by lobbyists for Canadian corporations, associations and unions, and by agents on behalf of foreign governments and other foreign interests, would be clearly aware of who is behind the representations."As a result, a Lobbying Registration Act (LRA) came into force on September 30, 1989. This piece of legislation introduced a de…nition of a lobbyist and a requirement for lobbyists to register with the Lobbyists Registrar. But more importantly, it requires lobbyists to provide information about the name and business address of the organization "that has a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbyists'activities on behalf of the client," all of its subsidiaries and corporate headquarters, if there is one. An amendment to the LRA, introduced in 1996, made this information publicly available. It also introduced a strict disclosure of funds policy applied to political parties. Together with the Canada Elections Act, the LRA made it di¢ cult for foreign …rms to lobby their interests in Canada directly.
Nevertheless, there are some loopholes in the legal restrictions, and politically active foreign …rms can still in ‡uence trade policy outcomes in at least two ways. First, they can hire Canadian agents and consultants to lobby the executive branch on their behalf and a¤ect policy outcomes in a way that suits the interests of foreign …rms. Second, subsidiaries of foreign enterprises can make legal political contributions with their own funds to defeat legislators who are unfriendly to their interests. Since there are no restrictions on the share of foreign capital in the assets of a company that makes political contributions, any local subsidiary of a foreign corporation can make political donations from its own funds if "it carries business in Canada." Moreover, almost any big foreign company that exports to Canada has an independent local sales department, which is legally allowed to lobby for a reduction in trade barriers on the products imported by its parent company into Canada. Lobbying e¤orts of such subsidiaries will be counter to the e¤orts of domestic …rms and, therefore, pooling all Canadian …rms together regardless of their ownership may lead to misleading results and estimation problems.
In the trade policy literature, corporate political activity is typically measured by …nancial contributions to candidates and political parties, while very little attention has been paid to other means of a¤ecting policy outcomes such as direct lobbying. However, earlier research on the effect of foreign companies on national policy (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000) suggests that foreign corporations prefer direct lobbying to political contributions not only because of legal restrictions on contributions, but also because of informal legitimacy questions for politicians with respect to accepting money from corporate sources with foreign ownership. Hansen and Mitchell found that because lobbying is less visible than contributions, foreigners use it as intensively (and e¤ectively) as domestic …rms do. Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) established a similar pattern: in the 1978 US election cycle, foreign corporations spent approximately 40% more on lobbying than their US counterparts contributed to political parties. For these reasons, lobbying expenditures seem to be a better measure of foreign political involvement, especially in countries with legal restrictions on political contributions by foreigners.
Unfortunately, data on lobbying expenditures by domestic and foreign corporations are unavailable for Canada. To measure the foreign lobby intensity in Canada, I collected the information on the number of lobbyists o¢ cially registered with the O¢ ce of the Registrar of Lobbyists, as is required by the LRA. The Act de…nes a lobbyist as "an individual who, for payment, undertakes to lobby on behalf of a client"and represents an organization in arranging meetings with public o¢ ce holders, or "communicate with a public o¢ ce holder in an attempt to in ‡uence the development of any legislative proposal, ... the making or amendment of any regulation, ... the development or amendment of any program or policy." Intuitively, the number of lobbyists hired by a company or industry should be highly correlated with the lobbying expenditure and hence can serve as a proxy for political activity. The lobbyists registration data is publicly available and is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2, but the following …gures illustrate the relative importance of foreign lobbying in Canada. In 1996-97, there were 1,032 o¢ cially registered lobbyists representing interests of manufacturing …rms regarding Canadian trade policy, with 47%, 26% and 27% of them acting on behalf of Canadian, US and ROW …rms, respectively. These numbers support previous …ndings by Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) and demonstrate that foreign agents have actively attempted to in ‡uence formation of domestic trade policy. The objective of the remaining part of the paper is to estimate the e¤ectiveness of lobbying by two interest groups (in the partner country and in the ROW) and compare it to the e¤ect of domestic lobbyists on Canadian trade policy.
The model
The theoretical model is based on the Grossman and Helpman (1994) political economy model and presents several modi…cations that allow for the presence of foreign lobbying and facilitate econometric estimation. In their original formulation, Grossman and Helpman considered a small open economy, which leaves no room for foreign companies to lobby because pre-tari¤ prices are …xed. In this work I develop and build into the GH setup a model of monopolistic competition with di¤erentiated goods to allow foreign …rms to gain or lose from import tari¤s.
There are N products (industries) in the model and three countries: Canada (Home country), the US (FTA Partner country) and the ROW, denoted by H; P and ROW , respectively. Industries are denoted by index i 2 f1; :::; N g and countries by j 2 fH; P; ROW g. There are n j i …rms in country j and industry i. These …rms are assumed to be symmetric within the same country and industry, i.e. they share the same cost structure and hence face the same demand functions and charge the same prices. In total, there are n
Firms within one country and sector are assumed to have the same constant marginal cost. This allows us to consider Canadian market independently from other markets, i.e. prices on the Canadian market depend only on the demand elasticity, the (…xed) number of …rms and the …xed marginal cost structure. Denoting a speci…c import tari¤ set by the home country government on imports of product i from country j as j i , we can write the pro…t of a country j …rm that produces product i as:
where q j i is the quantity supplied and c j i is the marginal costs. I assume that the number of …rms is large enough to ignore the e¤ect of their individual pricing decisions on the industry price index P i , i.e. each …rm takes the price index as given. Knowing product demand functions (3), each …rm sets the pro…t-maximizing price as a markup over its marginal costs:
For convenience, isolate costs from (6) and write down equilibrium pro…ts (5) as:
The government chooses import tari¤s to maximize a weighted sum of national welfare W and political contributions C:
where C H i , C P i and C ROW i are industry-wide political contributions from each country. Coe¢ cient a is a weight that the government assigns to national welfare relative to political contributions.
Coe¢ cients b and c re ‡ect the government's preferences for the US and ROW contributions, respectively, over the contributions by domestic …rms. As long as accepting contributions from foreign …rms involves risk of reputation loss or law infraction, politicians may prefer domestic contributions to overseas donations thus both coe¢ cients are presumably less than one.
Firms in industry i can organize themselves and form a group to lobby the local government for a change in trade policy. 3 Firms within the FTA pay no import tari¤s and hence lobby for more protection, while …rms from other countries lobby for lower tari¤s for the opposite reason. The lobby representing industry i of country j maximizes its welfare from obtaining protection net of political
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) , the equilibrium trade policy is a solution to a two-stage game. In the …rst stage, knowing the government's objective function, each organized lobbying group provides the government with a schedule of political contributions as a function of import tari¤. In the second stage, observing contribution schedules, the government sets trade policy that maximizes its objective function (8). Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that for truthful contribution schedules 4 the optimal trade policy is the one that maximizes joint surplus of the government and organized lobbying groups. Let i denote the share of the home country population entitled to the domestic industry i pro…ts, and I j i denote an index variable that takes the value of one when industry i in country j is politically organized and zero otherwise. The joint welfare function then takes the form:
where
is welfare of the domestic industry i gross of political contributions, T R and CS are total tari¤ revenue and consumer surplus, respectively, W j i = n j i j i ; j 2 fP; ROW g is gross welfare of foreign industries i from exports to the home county market, 3 With the number of …rms in the sector being limited by the endowment of sector-speci…c capital, …rms in each industry have an incentive to form a lobby group and seek for protection from foreign competition. Here I ignore the free-riding problem within each sector. See Bombardini (2005) for an extensive discussion of …rm-level contribution decision. 4 Contribution is de…ned as truthful if it re ‡ects the true preferences of lobbying group for any possible policy outcome.
and W = P i (n H i H i ) + T R + CS is national welfare. Taking the …rst order condition of the joint welfare function with respect to the ROW import tari¤ rate and rearranging it, one obtains the expression for the equilibrium trade policy: 5
denotes the share of country j …rms on the Canadian market for product i. On the left-hand side of (10), ROW i =p ROW i is the ad-valorem tari¤ on the ROW imports, which is multiplied by the price elasticity of demand for the ROW imports " i . Therefore, as in the benchmark GH model, trade protection is inversely related to the import demand elasticity. 6 The …rst term on the right-hand side is negative: the model predicts that with more di¤erentiated varieties will receive import subsidy. This result is a direct consequence of monopolistic competition model with speci…c import tari¤. 7
The second element on the right-hand side shows the positive relation between the FTA external and internal tari¤s and re ‡ects a tari¤ complementarity e¤ect: if the tari¤ rate for the partner country is high, it is optimal for the government to raise the external tari¤ as well. 8 Intuitively, an increase in the within-FTA tari¤ rate causes a decline in imports from the ROW, and tari¤ revenue collected on the ROW imports is higher for higher ROW . This, in turn, rises imports from the partner country, that generates more tari¤ revenue for higher partner country tari¤ rate. The tari¤ complementarity e¤ect is proportional to the market share of the partner country …rms s P i and is stronger if the partner country and the ROW exports are close substitutes.
In contrast to the benchmark case, even for unorganized industries protection may still be positive due to the imperfectly competitive market structure, as emphasized by the third term, since the coe¢ cient a a+ is positive. Because the share of domestic …rms on the market re ‡ects their ability to capture protection bene…ts, the tari¤ level is proportional to s H i and increasing with . The fourth term is similar to the benchmark GH model: a politically organized domestic 5 Details on derivation of equation (10) are provided in Appendix. 6 It should be noted that without the MFN rule, a set of equilibrium tari¤s for all importers would be determined by a system of simultaneous equations with the number of equations being equal to the number of importing countries.
With the MFN and the FTA, the number of equations goes down to two. However, under complete trade liberalization agreement, a within-FTA tari¤ is exogenously set to zero and the second term on the right-hand side of (10) vanishes. 7 In the model of monopolistic competition, the e¤ect of a speci…c tari¤ on price is ampli…ed by producer's markup.
Therefore, for low the price elasticity with respect to tari¤ is high and the gain consumer surplus from a subsidy outweighs the increase in government's expenditure. 8 This result is consistent with other studies, e.g. Bagwell and Staiger (1997) , Ornelas (2005a,b) .
industry receives more protection from the government. Moreover, the level of protection is higher if domestic and imported varieties are close substitutes and if the domestic sector is relatively large, as the domestic lobby has more to gain from protection in this case.
The …fth term re ‡ects the e¤ect of political activity by partner country …rms on the national trade policy. I p i enters the equation positively, making protection more likely in those sectors where partner country exporters are organized into lobbying groups and where product varieties are closer substitutes. Similarly to the domestic lobby, the e¤ect of partner country …rms lobbying on the import tari¤ is proportional to their market share.
The last term is negative and re ‡ects the e¤ect of lobbying e¤orts by the ROW …rms to reduce protection. As before, the scaling factor i 1 i re ‡ects higher motivation by the ROW …rms to lobby for trade liberalization when the degree of substitution between varieties within a given industry is high, but unlike domestic and partner country lobbying, the ROW lobbying intensity declines with the market share. The intuition behind this result is an increased damage from protection for small ROW industries, and as a consequence these industries will resist tari¤ increase more intensively. 9 As in the GH model, domestic and partner country's lobbying results in overprotection and welfare reduction relative to the …rst-best outcome. The presence of an organized foreign lobby from the ROW may help to (partially) restore the optimal level of import tari¤s and raise national welfare. However, the presence of the ROW lobbying alone causes underprotection and is thus welfare-reducing. Therefore, the overall net e¤ect from the presence of the partner country lobbying is likely to lead to welfare reduction, whereas the overall welfare e¤ect of the ROW lobbying activity is unambiguous: the e¤ect is positive if ROW …rms counter-lobby against the e¤ort of domestic and partner country …rms to raise protection and negative if ROW …rms form a single organized lobbying group in the sector.
The data
The empirical section of this paper estimates the e¤ects of domestic, partner country and ROW lobbying activity on the Canadian post-NAFTA trade policy. Primarily, I use two measures for trade barriers: import tari¤s and the share of imports that is subject to tari¤ or non-tari¤ trade restrictions. The US was treated as a Canadian FTA partner country, while all other countries that have no preferential trade agreements with Canada were aggregated into ROW. The estimation of equation (10) requires the following data: the measure for trade protection, imports by the country of origin and by sector, domestic output by sectors, substitution and price elasticities, political organization dummies, and three sets of instruments for market shares. This study is conducted for 249 Canadian 6-digit NAICS manufacturing sectors (NAICS 31-33) for the period of 1996-97. In light of this, I used tari¤, NTBs and protection coverage share as a measure of protection. Advalorem tari¤ rates were obtained as the ratio of aggregated duty collected by customs over the value of imports. 10 NTBs for Canadian imports were obtained from the TRAINS database maintained by UNCTAD, which shows the proportion of imports that is covered by one or more qualitative restrictions. These data were available at the HS-6 level and were aggregated into NAICS-6 groups.
Protection measures and market shares
In addition, the protection share variable was constructed as the share of Canadian imports that is subject either to the positive import tari¤ or NTBs.
Descriptive statistics for protection measures and market shares are presented in Table 1 . In 1997 the average tari¤ rate, NTBs and protection coverage ratios for the ROW imports were 4.8%, 18.2% and 77.5%, respectively. Tari¤s and NTBs are highly correlated both within and outside of the FTA, which implies that di¤erent measures of protection are still highly complementary.
Political organization dummies
Previous studies that have tested the GH model empirically used …rm-level political contributions to assign the value for the political organization dummy variable. 11 Although these data are available for Canada for 1997 and afterwards, this paper uses a di¤erent approach. As was previously mentioned, foreign corporations prefer direct lobbying to political contributions because transparency of political contributions may raise concerns about foreign interference into political processes. Furthermore, since di¤erent means of political involvement are highly correlated (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000) , direct lobbying seems to be an appropriate measure for domestic political activity as well.
In this work, the degree of political activity in an industry is measured by the number of lobbyists representing the corporate interests of that industry. The Lobbyists Registration Act (LRA) requires every individual to register at the Lobby Registrar Canada if the person seeks a meeting or a phone call to any public o¢ ce holder regarding the development, modi…cation or cancellation of legislative proposals, regulations, public policies and programs. The assumption that political contributions will be ine¤ective for the determination of trade policy without such contact seems to be reasonable and, therefore, political contributions should be followed up by a personal contact with a policymaker. For this reason, the number of registered lobbyists is used to measure …rm-level lobbying intensity within an industry.
The main advantage of this data set is the large amount of detailed information lobbyists are required to submit. This includes information on the business address of a corporation that bene…ts from lobbying, its subsidiaries and headquarters, and the objective of the meeting with a public o¢ ce holder. This information is very helpful in determining the "nationality" and industrial a¢ liation of lobbyists representing interests of multi-product multinational corporations. Another advantage of this data set is that it gives a very narrow de…nition of a lobbyist. Any person representing his or her own interests, and who is not being paid for arranging the meeting with the public o¢ ce holder, is not obliged to register. This removes information on the very small …rms. Large …rms, which have high lobbying power and can e¤ectively in ‡uence the decisions of policymakers, typically use the service of professional consultants or corporate lobbyists, who are required to register.
Firms were assigned a NAICS-6 industry code using the Canadian Company Capability database maintained by Industry Canada. Assigning an industry code to multi-product …rms involves some degree of discretion. For example, some …rms in the automobile sector operate in more than ten NAICS-6 industries. Since the number of such …rms is relatively small, I assigned primary, sec-1 1 e.g. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) , Bombardini (2005) , Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006) . ondary and tertiary NAICS codes to such …rms using di¤erent information sources: the Canadian Company Capability database, the Federal Corporations Registry and the North America Compustat database. The databases listed above allow assigning industry codes to US and ROW …rms.
The LRA also requires lobbyists to declare a "subject-matter in respect to which an individual undertakes to communicate with a public o¢ ce holder."In many cases, information on the purpose of lobbying activity reported in the lobbyist registration form allowed me to attribute a …rm to a single (or a small number of) primary NAICS code.
National a¢ liation of each …rm that a particular lobbyist is representing was determined from two sources. First, the lobbyist registration form requires registrants to provide "the name and business address of the parent corporation and those subsidiaries which directly bene…t from the lobbying." Sometimes, lobbyists provide incomplete information and in this case it was complemented by the information from other databases mentioned previously. Again, quite often the "nationality" of the …rm was determined by the "objective" section of the lobbyist registration form. 12 There are two more advantages of using lobbyists'registry data over using political contribution data. First, the necessity of reporting the objective of the contact with the public o¢ ce holders allows one to isolate e¤ectively those …rms that lobby particularly for a change in trade policy. This is especially a problem for domestic lobbyists: on average, only one out of eight lobbyists, representing the domestic manufacturing sector, is concerned with trade policy. Therefore, pooling political contributions by all domestic …rms may cause serious measurement problems for the political organization variable.
Second, the main channel used by foreign …rms to lobby their interest in Canada is through local subsidiaries, which distribute the imported goods within Canada. Formally, these …rms should be assigned to a trade sector code and dropped from the sample, but this would substantially underestimate lobbying e¤orts by foreign …rms. For each trade …rm concerned with international trade policy issues I used the company pro…le and lobbying objectives information to assign an appropriate manufacturing industry code and country.
The amendment to the LRA announced in 1995 introduced several important re…nements that made it more desirable to use post-1995 lobbying data. First, for the purpose of transparency, the lobbyists'connections to the public o¢ ce holders were opened to public scrutiny, and the lobbyists' registry database became available for research purposes. Second, this amendment extended the amount of information that must be reported. Most importantly, it made disclosed information more complete and reliable. For the …rst time lobbyists were obliged to provide all the information, and e¤ective enforcement devices were introduced to encourage better compliance. It extended the power of the Lobbyists Registrar, which was authorized to seek clari…cation of information submitted. The registrar was allowed to conduct an audit of provided information and, when necessary, investigate the provided information. Sanctions for violating the LRA were also increased: "every individual who contravenes any part of the Act . . . is liable to a …ne not exceeding twenty-…ve thousand dollars. On proceedings by way of indictment, an individual is liable to a …ne of up to one hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both (LRA, Section 14)."
For these reasons, the data for political activity by …rms were collected for the 1997 election cycle and complemented with the 1996 lobbying data to take into account any possible small lag in trade policy response to lobbying e¤orts. Similarly with regard to other studies, several thresholds for the number of lobbyists in an industry will be set to determine the values of political organization dummies.
As a …nal note on the lobbyists'registry data, I will brie ‡y discuss the reliability of this database.
In 2001 an independent study of compliance to the LRA was conducted by KPMG Consulting Inc. (2001) . The already-registered lobbyists were asked if they were aware of any non-compliance behavior. Reported results indicate that 50% of consultant lobbyists and 15% of corporate lobbyists were aware of non-registered lobbying, while they evaluated the aggregate compliance rate at 70% and 100%, respectively. In general, compliance was perceived to be high, although non-compliance behavior is still an important issue.
Descriptive statistics for the number of lobbyists is provided in Table 2 and the distribution of lobbyists across sectors is shown in Figure 1 .
The elasticity of substitution
To my knowledge, there are no studies to date that estimate substitution elasticities for Canadian NAICS-6 industries, especially within a framework of monopolistic competition. In this study, substitution elasticities were estimated using the approach by Feenstra (1994) , recently applied by Broda and Weinstein (2006) to a large set of US imported commodities. This approach identi…es supply and demand elasticities using no instrumental variables, and relies only on the assumption of independent supply and demand disturbances. The complete derivation of the estimator is presented in Appendix C. It also includes a discussion of a possible estimation bias due to a small sample size and a proposed solution to that problem.
The summary statistics and a histogram of the elasticity estimates are presented in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3. Price elasticities of the ROW import demand were calculated using (9a). As a robustness check, I estimated the substitution elasticities for NAICS industries at various level of aggregation and veri…ed that more aggregated commodities are more di¤erentiated: the average value of decreased from 5.85 to 5.34 and 4.56 while moving respectively from six to …ve and four digits NAICS. As another robustness check, I estimated US elasticity of substitution using the same procedure for the same year and industry classi…cation. Presumably, Canada and the US should have similar tastes, and varieties that are close substitutes in Canada should be close substitutes in the US as well. This suggestion is supported by Figure 4 , which compares the percentage deviation from the mean for Canadian and US estimates and shows a very close relationship in the perception of product characteristics in Canada and US.
Instrumental variables
In equation (10), market shares are likely to be determined simultaneously with the tari¤ rates and should be properly instrumented. Tre ‡er (1993) proposed to instrument the import penetration ratio with industry factor endowments as the measure of comparative advantage independent of the level of protection. Following this approach, a list of instruments for the Canadian market share includes: the share of productive to non-productive workers, the capital stock in machinery and construction, inventories, and the consumption of fuel and electricity. All of these data are provided by Statistics Canada. The same list of instruments was constructed for the US market share in Canada using the US Census data.
To instrument the ROW share in the Canadian market, two "gravity" variables were built.
The …rst one is the distance between Canada and the average exporter. For every product, the pair-wise log-distance between Canada and the exporting country was weighted by the share of this country in the global export of the product. 13 The total exports by country and by sector were constructed using the UNCTAD database. For the geographic distance two measures were used: a simple geographic distance between two capital cities, and a distance weighted by population density and economic activity within each country. These data were taken from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. The rationale for using this "distance" variable is the following: if main producers of a particular good are located far from Canada, the ROW share in the Canadian market is likely to be small.
The second "gravity" variable is a log of worldwide exports of a product by all countries ex-porting to Canada. The intuition for including this variable as an instrument is the same as for using GDP in the bilateral trade gravity model: the more the ROW countries produce (and export) worldwide, the more they will export to Canada in particular, and the larger the ROW share in the Canadian market should be.
In previous tests of the GH model, political organization dummies were derived from political contributions and treated as endogenous, because contributions are directly related to tari¤s. In the data set used in this paper there is no direct link between the import tari¤ rate and the number of lobbyists. However, I instrument the political organization variable as well for the reason of possible measurement error, such as assignment to the wrong industry or missing information on the number of lobbyists. To instrument the US and Canadian political organization dummies, I
use the information on the total number of …rms in an industry, shares of big and medium …rms, and the CR-4 concentration ratio. The ROW lobbying intensity is instrumented with the ratio of exports by ROW …rms to Canada relative to their worldwide exports in an industry.
Estimation procedure
Equation (10) motivates the following form of the estimation equation:
In equation (10) the inverse elasticity was taken on the left-hand side and both sides were multiplied by i i 1 because substitution elasticity is likely to be measured with error. Using (12), the four coe¢ cient estimates of the reduced form (11) can be used to derive four structural parameters of the model.
There are several issues regarding the estimation of (11) that should be addressed. First, the right-hand side variables of (11) include non-linear combinations of endogenous variables. To deal with this problem the set of instrumental variables includes the ones described in the Section 4.4 above, their square terms and interactions. 14 Second, using many instruments relative to the sample size and to the number of instrumented variables leads to a bias of 2SLS towards OLS results (Hansen, Hausman and Newey, 2006) . The third problem with a small ratio of endogenous variables to the number of instruments is a problem 1 4 This IV estimator was proposed by Kelejian (1971) . of weak instruments. When the correlation between the endogenous variable and most of the instruments is weak, conventional asymptotics may provide poor approximations for the reduced form estimates and test statistics, and inferences on the signi…cance of coe¢ cients may be very misleading. Finally, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point to the problem of heteroskedasticity of the error term in (11), which may be correlated with the imperfectly measured elasticity of substitution. Therefore, equation (11) requires an estimator that will be robust to the problems of many instruments, many weak instruments and heteroskedasticity. Several estimation procedures that address these problems were proposed recently in the econometrics literature. 15 I used LIML with Bekker (1994) standard error correction. Hansen, Hausman, and Newey (2006) demonstrated that this approach has better small sample properties than 2SLS and is asymptotically correct in the presence of many instruments and many weak instruments. It results in tests with the correct size and the tests can be made robust to heteroskedasticity through the use of conventional robust covariance matrix estimators. 16
Results

Test of a benchmark GH model
As a starting point, I will present the results on a GH version of the model with homogeneous goods to test how well the new data on Canada can …t the benchmark model and compare its performance with the results of previous empirical studies. Since in the benchmark model markets are perfectly competitive and import supply is in…nitely elastic, there is no reason for foreign …rms to participate in lobbying, and in the benchmark case I will consider only the e¤ect of domestic lobbying groups on the home country trade policy.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , the optimal import tari¤ for a small open economy with politically organized sector-speci…c factors of production takes the following form:
where X h i is a domestic value of shipments and M i is a total value of imports. The model predicts that the inverse import penetration ratio enters the equation negatively, while the coe¢ cient on its interaction with political organization dummy is positive. Table 4 represents estimation results for equation (13) using tari¤s, NTBs and protection share data as a measure of Canadian trade barriers.
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , several thresholds were used for the number of lobbyists in the construction of political organization dummies to verify that the results are not driven by the way these dummies are assigned. In the …rst column of Table 4 an industry is considered to be politically organized if it is represented by at least one lobbyist. For the second and third columns the threshold is two and three lobbyists, respectively. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) .
The estimates of the structural parameters of the model vary considerably across di¤erent measures of protection. However, the variances of these parameters are very high and one cannot reject hypotheses that both and a are the same across all speci…cations considered. The fraction of the population represented by a lobby, , is estimated to be around 0:6 for the speci…cations with tari¤s, 0:2 for speci…cations with protection shares, and greater than one for speci…cations with NTBs. In general, 95% con…dence interval for includes the whole [0; 1] interval and the model does not allow one to obtain a precise measure for . Nevertheless, the obtained results do not contradict the previous estimates of by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) , who estimated the share of the population represented by interest groups to be around 0:85 and unity, respectively.
The estimates of the government's political bias vary from 10 in the speci…cation with shares to 100 in speci…cation with tari¤s. The values of the parameter a greater then ten imply that the government assigns approximately equal weights to political contributions and to a national welfare net of political contributions, which supports the results of studies that use US data. 17 Overall, the results of the GH model with Canadian data are broadly consistent with those 1 7 The government's objective function C + aW is equivalent to a1C + a2 (W C), in which a = a 2 a 1 a 2 , a1 is the weight on political contributions and a2 is the weight on a welfare net of political contributions. Therefore when a is much greater than one, a1 = a+1 a a2 a2.
obtained by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and other studies for the US. These results will serve as a benchmark against which the results of the monopolistic competition model with foreign lobbying and FTA participation will be compared in the next section.
Estimation results for the monopolistic competition model with foreign lobby
In this section I present the estimation results for the political economy model of trade with monopolistic competition, FTA membership and two groups of foreign lobbies. The results from the equation (11) appear in Table 5 , in which several measures are used to measure trade barriers.
Columns with di¤erent numbers denote di¤erent threshold levels for construction of the political organization variable. Columns (1) and (2) report the results when an industry is assumed to be politically organized if it has at least one and three lobbyists, respectively. In column (3) a country's j industry is organized if it is represented by at least three lobbyists and accounts for strictly more than one third of a total number of lobbyists in that industry. This measure was constructed to exclude sectors with a positive but small number of lobbyists relative to the whole industry.
First, note that for any measure of protection and political organization, the coe¢ cient 1 is positive and almost always statistically signi…cant, implying that domestic industries receive a positive level of protection regardless of political economy factors. This is consistent with the prediction of the model that the welfare-maximizing government always …nds it worthwhile to protect home country producers against competing importers when domestic and foreign products are close substitutes and markets are imperfectly competitive. The positive level of protection for unorganized sectors is in contrast to the benchmark GH model and …nds strong support in the data.
As the theory predicts, among politically unorganized sectors protection increases with the share of domestic …rms on the market. When protection is measured with tari¤s, the point estimate for 1 in the most preferred speci…cation in terms of the log-likelihood function (column (3)) is 0:21, which converts to the welfare-maximizing ad-valorem import tari¤ of 2:2% for an average Canadian industry, given the average Canadian market share, price and substitution elasticities of 0:66, 5:32 and 5:83, respectively. In terms of the optimal level of NTBs and protection share, the welfaremaximizing NTB coverage for the average industry is estimated to be 8:9% of total imports from outside of the FTA, while the welfare-maximizing share of imports subject to any trade restriction is 17:9%.
The e¤ect of a politically organized domestic lobbying (coe¢ cient 2 ) is always estimated to be positive and very signi…cant, independently of the construction of the political organization dummy and the measure of trade distortion. Everything else being equal, active domestic lobbying in the industry leads to a higher level of protection and this e¤ect is signi…cant and robust across all speci…cations. The presence of a politically organized domestic lobby tends to increase import tari¤s by 5:4% for the average industry, the NTB coverage ratio by 29:7%, and the protection share by 31:7%.
The novel results of this section are the estimates of coe¢ cients 3 and 4 . The coe¢ cient 3 measures the e¤ect of the FTA partner country's lobbying and is always estimated to be positive, although in speci…cations with tari¤s it is only marginally signi…cant. The e¤ect of the ROW lobbying (coe¢ cient 4 ) is always negative and signi…cant at 5% except for two speci…cations with NTBs. According to these results, the presence of politically organized US industries in Canada leads to higher Canadian import barriers and the ROW lobbying e¤ort is negatively correlated with the Canadian protection measures. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that, while our results do not allow researchers to get a precise estimate of 3 , they strongly support the hypothesis of foreign lobby di¤erentiation with respect to market access implied by the FTA and predicted by the theoretical model of Section 3. The point estimates of coe¢ cient 3 in speci…cations with the best data …t are 0:345 (column (3) for tari¤s), 3:033 (column (3) for NTBs) and 5:041 (columns (2) for protection share). These estimates imply that a politically organized industry in the FTA partner country tends to increase a country's average import tari¤ by 1:2%, average NTB coverage by 10:5% and average protection coverage by 17:4%. Similarly, the presence of a politically organized group of exporters from outside of the FTA tends to decrease the average Canadian import tari¤ by 3:4%, the average NTB by 9:8% and the average protection share by 34:9%. These numbers are economically plausible and provide additional support to the estimates of the model. (11) allow one to derive the values of the structural parameters of the model. As expected, absolute magnitudes of coe¢ cient 4 are always less than 2 , which implies that ROW lobbying is relatively less important for Canadian policymakers than lobbying by domestic …rms (c < 1). This result is not surprising given the legislative restrictions on contributions by foreign …rms in Canada. In spite of that, policymakers'valuation of contributions from abroad is still positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The estimates of the government's preferences towards political contributions from the FTA partner country (parameter b) depend on the protection measure that US …rms are trying to a¤ect. In lobbying for tari¤s, partner country contributions are estimated to be 35 80% less e¤ective than domestic contributions, while in lobbying for NTBs the e¤ectiveness of domestic and partner country lobbying is approximately equal. Finally, when trade distortions are measured by protection share, the government's valuation of political contributions from the FTA partner country relative to domestic ones rises to 1:63, but the hypothesis that b 1 can never be rejected.
Estimates of equation
At the same time, US contributions seem to be more important than contributions from the ROW. Depending on the speci…cation, the government's valuation of US contributions is estimated to be two times the valuation of contributions from other countries. Among possible reasons are greater proximity of the US and Canadian …nancial systems and a more sophisticated mixture of asset structure that makes it more di¢ cult to distinguish between Canadian and US …rms (relative to the distinction between Canadian and ROW …rms).
The estimates of the population share organized into lobbying vary substantially across di¤erent speci…cations. In tari¤ equations, the parameter is always greater than one, but the standard error is very large and 95% con…dence intervals almost always overlap with the [0; 1] interval. In equations with NTBs and protection shares, point estimates for are also very imprecise and in all speci…cations one cannot rule out the possibility that is negative. 18 As for the relative importance of national welfare for the government, the parameter a is estimated to be 0.3-0.5 with reasonable degree of precision as compared to the benchmark GH model.
It implies that when organized interests lobby for a change in tari¤ policy, the government's valuation of political contributions is three to …ve times higher than the valuation of national welfare net of contribution. The result that policymakers are driven mostly by political contributions they receive from di¤erent lobby groups sharply contrasts with results obtained previously in a perfectly competitive setup: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) estimated a to be over 3,000; in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) its value is around 70. My own estimates for Canada fall in the range 50-65 (see Section 6.1). However, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) recognized that high estimates of a contradict the empirical evidence that welfare loss from protection is always greater than the amount of political contributions policymakers receive in exchange for protection. Intuitively, a < 1 is what we should expect to get in the empirical model, because an increase in pro…t from a 1% increase in tari¤ (i.e., the maximum contribution that the government could get for protection) is always lower than the corresponding decrease in welfare. Therefore, in order to observe any positive tari¤ above the welfare maximizing level in the equilibrium, the government should put a stronger emphasis on contributions relative to welfare and thus a < 1 is a desirable feature of the empirical model.
Estimates of the reduced form (11) shown in Table 5 have a meaningful economic interpretation for an average Canadian industry. Given the average market shares of the three groups of …rms, price and substitution elasticities, one can back up the welfare maximizing level of protection and 1 8 It should be pointed out that that measuring is a standard problem in the literature and its estimation proved to be di¢ cult. the average e¤ect of each lobby group on Canadian trade policy. Table 6 presents the average and marginal e¤ect of each lobby group on di¤erent measures of protection. Marginal e¤ects are calculated as the e¤ect of a particular lobbying group on an industry with average characteristics, and are discussed earlier in this section. Average e¤ects are calculated as a simple average of the …tted values of the dependent variable implied by the model estimates. As a result, the average Canadian industry receives 1:33% import tari¤s, 7:31% NTB coverage and 7:81% protection share from lobbying by domestic …rms; 0:21% tari¤s, 1:87% NTBs and 4:26% protection share from lobbying by partner country …rms; 0:48% tari¤s, 1:38% NTBs and 6:24% protection share from lobbying by ROW …rms. These results are economically reasonable and statistically signi…cant.
Robustness
This section explores the robustness of the previous results to the treatment of foreign lobbies operating in Canada. Table 7 represents a sensitivity analysis of the benchmark model results when one cannot di¤erentiate between domestic and foreign lobbying activity and attributes all or part of politically active foreign …rms to domestic industry lobbying. Table 7 In the last three columns of Table 7 all foreign …rms that are politically active in Canada are treated as Canadian, and they show that the results are not robust to the treatment of the ROW lobbying. Table 8 shows how robust the results of the monopolistically competitive model are to the exclusion of one or two foreign lobby factors. As in the previous section, I only consider the tari¤ equation here for two reasons. First, results are qualitatively the same when the NTB or protection share are used to measure trade distortions. Second, equations in tari¤s give higher precision and …t the data better. The …rst three columns replicate the results from Table 6 for comparison. The estimation results in Table 8 suggest that including the e¤ect of the US and ROW signi…cantly improves the …t of the model. However, to a large extent, this is due to the inclusion of the ROW lobby: the likelihood ratio test always rejects the model without ROW lobbying. At the same time, omitting the lobbying activity by US …rms reduces the log-likelihood, but the likelihood ratio test fails to reject the model without US lobbying. Another important implication of Table 8 is that the estimates of 1 and 2 -and thus the structural estimates of the model -are not a¤ected seriously when foreign lobbying is excluded.
Coe¢ cients on
The second set of robustness checks repeats the same thought experiment used for the benchmark model, by assuming that one cannot distinguish domestic from foreign lobbying activity. In columns A and B of Table 9 the US …rms that are politically active in Canada are treated as Canadian. Furthermore, in column A the lobbying activity by ROW …rms is ignored. Finally, in column C all foreign …rms that are politically active in Canada are assumed to be Canadian.
Results of Table 9 suggest that the inability to distinguish Canadian lobbying from US lobbying tends to overestimate the e¤ect of domestic lobbying and its average e¤ect of import tari¤, but does not make a big e¤ect on the model's …t, unless ROW lobbying is excluded. However, the estimates of Table 8 are not robust to the treatment of the ROW lobbying intensity: not only does the variance of estimators increase, but also the estimates of 2 are biased downwards. This result is not particularly surprising given the fact that the lobbying objectives of ROW …rms are opposite to those of home country …rms. At the beginning of this paper I noted the concern that the inability to separate the e¤ect of foreign lobbying from domestic may lead to misleading results even when a proper set of instruments is used. This concern …nds strong support in the data.
The comparison of the benchmark with monopolistic competition GH models
To test two competing versions of the GH model estimated by instrumental variables, I used a J-Test for non-nested hypothesis testing (Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) , p. 388). The testing procedure requires the same dependent variable, so for the purpose of this section both sides of (11) were multiplied by The J-test results for three measures of protection are presented in Table 10 . They suggest that neither model can be rejected as a correct one when protection is measured with tari¤s. However, the benchmark GH model is always weakly rejected in favor of the model with monopolistic competition as the monopolistically competitive speci…cation of the model adds more explanatory power.
The second part of each section of the table displays J-test results for the benchmark model and monopolistic competition with only domestic lobbying, using the same set of instruments. Again, neither model can be rejected, but these results suggest that simply taking into account the imperfectly competitive structure of the market improves the explanatory power of the "Protection for sale" model. 
Conclusion
The main objective of this paper is to study the e¤ect of foreign lobbies and FTA formation on a country's trade policy. This paper accomplishes this goal by modifying the original GH model through the introduction of a monopolistically competitive market structure to allow for the presence of two types of foreign lobbies: lobbies from the FTA partner country and from the ROW.
The paper shows that signing a free trade agreement with a big country leads to a welfare-reducing increase in import tari¤s in the presence of foreign lobbying, in particular lobbying by an FTA partner country.
The empirical results suggest that the GH model with monopolistic competition has more explanatory power than its original version. For Canada, the e¤ect of foreign lobbying is statistically signi…cant and is in line with theoretical predictions of the model: presence of an organized lobbying group in the FTA partner country tends to raise import tari¤s, while an organized lobbying group of exporters from other countries is associated with lower import tari¤s. A major bene…t of the approach used in this paper is a more plausible set of values obtained for the government valuation of political contributions. Contrary to previous studies, the result that the government values political contributions more than national welfare is very persistent and explains why relatively small political contributions have signi…cant e¤ect on trade policy through lobbying.
The equilibrium trade policy is derived by maximizing the sum of the government and lobbying groups'welfare functions (9):
ROW g -welfare of the partner country and ROW industry i from trade W = P i (n H i H i ) + T R + CS -national welfare Before deriving the optimal trade policy, calculate the responsiveness of equilibrium prices and quantities to the change in the ROW tari¤. An increase in the ROW tari¤ will not a¤ect equilibrium prices of domestic and partner country …rms directly, but will increase equilibrium quantities q j i through an increase in the aggregate price index P i . Firms from the ROW will have a direct negative e¤ect on equilibrium quantity through an increase in consumer price (6) and an indirect positive e¤ect through an increase in the aggregate industry price index.
For future convenience, de…ne the share of country j …rms on Canadian market for the product i:
The e¤ect of the ROW tari¤ rate on industry price index can be expressed as:
Now we can calculate the e¤ect of the ROW tari¤ change on welfare terms in the objective function (9). The element
is a common factor that I want to isolate in every equation.
Tari¤ revenue:
Consumer surplus:
Pro…t functions:
Substituting (6a), (7a) and (8a) into the derivative of (9) with respect to the ROW tari¤ rate we obtain:
Rearranging and isolating the ROW tari¤ rate on the left-hand side we the obtain optimal trade policy:
Where " i is the price elasticity of demand for the ROW imports:
Appendix B: Estimation of the Elasticities of Substitution
To simplify notation, time index is omitted in this section. We start with the description of supplydemand system. From equation (3), total demand for the imports of product i imported from country j equals:
Since using expenditure shares instead of quantities reduces measurement error, the above equation is transformed into shares:
Taking logs and time di¤erencing, we obtain the new demand equation:
The error term in (1b) is likely to be correlated with the market shares due to simultaneity in determination of market shares and product prices. To model this simultaneity, following Feenstra (1994) let the supply equation for variety j of good i to take the form:
where e i is the inverse supply elasticity and j is a technology parameter. Taking logs and time di¤erencing we obtain a modi…ed supply equation:
To derive the supply equation in the form of expenditure shares, substitute the expression for quantity supplied from (1b) into (3b):
To facilitate estimation it is convenient to eliminate product-speci…c …xed e¤ects from supply and demand equations through taking the di¤erence in (2b) and (4b) 
Where e x ij = ( ln x j i ln k i ) for any variable x. Although in the model I aggregated all non-NAFTA countries into the ROW, in this section I treat the output of each country as a separate product and assumed that the number of varieties equals to one (Canadian product) plus the number of importing countries. With the assumption that the ROW …rms are symmetric, treating product of each country as a separate variety does not a¤ect predictions of the model. Therefore, after di¤erencing, the number of cross-sections in equation (5b) equals to the number of countries that import product i into Canada.
For consistent estimation of substitution elasticity parameters, the assumption of independent error terms in (5b) is critical, i.e. technological factor is assumed to be independent of the taste for variety parameter:
With this assumption, isolate error terms on the right-hand side of (5b) and multiply them through:
Several authors 19 showed that a consistent estimates of 1 and 2 can be obtained by the IV estimator, where instruments are country indicators. To demonstrate this result, append (6b) across varieties for each product:
The total number of observations in (8b) is T C i , where T is the number of periods in the sample and C i is the number of countries that import product i into Canada. Introduce T C i C i matrix of instrumental variables where each column j is an indicator variable for the importing country j, such that vector e j is a T -dimensional vector of 1's: Then, for the …xed number of importing countries Z is a set of valid instruments as T ! 1. First, Assumption 1 guarantees that p lim
For example Angrist (1991) and Angrist, Imbens, and Krueger (1999) .
the C i -dimensional vector with elements 1 T e ij e " ij , each approaching zero under the Assumption 1.
Independence of supply and demand error terms implies that instruments Z are uncorrelated with the error in (8b). Feenstra (1994) also showed that p lim
i X i has a full column rank under a technical restriction that the demand and supply curves should vary across countries, i.e. for each product there should be some variance either in taste or in productivity parameters across varieties. Therefore, the rank condition for identi…cation is satis…ed. Together with p lim
i u i = 0, this condition guarantees that the IV estimator with instrument matrix Z is consistent.
To make the estimator identical to the one used in Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) , pre-multiply equation (8b) with Z(Z 0 Z) 1 Z 0 to obtain:
where upper bars denote time averages. The OLS estimator on (9b) is identical to the IV estimator on (8b), thus, a consistent estimator of the reduced form parameters 1 and 2 can be obtained by averaging equation (7b) over time and estimating it with the weighted OLS for each product i.
Weights t ij , the number of years country j was exporting product i to Canada, are used to compensate for the di¤erent number of observations (number of years) for each importing country.
Even though estimator (10b) is consistent as T goes to in…nity, several authors point to its bad performance in small samples where Assumption 1 may not hold. 20 The data set used in this work covers the period from 1988 to 2004, while the average number of importing countries per product equals 80. The number of cross-sections is, probably, too large relative to the number of years to rely on asymptotic theory. The problem of a small sample can be solved using a correction method similar to the Deaton (1985) error-in-variables estimator.
Let Y i and X i to be the unobserved population means, and Y i and X i to be their sample estimates. Assume the following sample structure: 0
The normality assumption is not critical here. Let to be a moment matrix for X i , XX a sample moment matrix for X i , and XY a cross moment matrix for Y i and X i . The following equalities must hold:
The OLS estimator for can be written as follows:
The di¤erence between this estimator and WLS estimator (10b) is that the sample counterparts for variances in xy and can be calculated using all T C i observations, and estimator (11b) is consistent for C i ! 1 holding T …xed.
Finally, the estimator I used is the WLS estimator (10b) with the small sample correction (11b):
And b xy and b ij are the sample counterparts for xy and :
The matrix of covariates X i also includes a constant term to address the problem of measurement error in prices. On the left-hand side of (6b) we have second moment for prices, which equals to the variance of true prices plus the variance of the measurement error. Thus, the constant term will absorb the measurement error in prices. Since market shares are not correlated with unit values errors, explanatory variable will not be a¤ected by the measurement error. Therefore, inclusion of a constant term in X i makes the estimator (12b) robust to the measurement error in prices.
Once we obtain the vector of estimates b i , we can derive the structural parameter of interest i from (7b):
To avoid the imaginary values, the condition 2 2 + 4 1 0 must hold. In fact, this condition was satis…ed every single time the estimate for i was statistically signi…cant. Notes: 1). Standard errors in parenthesis 2). In columns (1), (2) and (3) industry is politically organized if it is represented by 1, 2 and 3 lobbyists, respectively 3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 2). In columns (1) and (2) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by 1 and 3 lobbyists, respectively. In column (3) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by at least 3 lobbyists and accounts for strictly more than one third of the total number of lobbyists in that industry.
3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively Log- 2). In the first six columns partner country lobbying is treated as domestic. In the last three columns all foreign lobby is treated as domestic.
3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 2). In columns (1) and (2) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by 1 and 3 lobbyists, respectively. In column (3) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by at least 3 lobbyists and accounts for strictly more than one third of the total number of lobbyists in that industry.
3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 2). In the first six columns partner country lobbying is treated as domestic. In the last three columns all foreign lobby is treated as domestic.
3). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 2). MC stays for "Monopolistic competition" version of GH model 3). In columns (1) and (2) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by 1 and 3 lobbyists, respectively. In column (3) an industry is politically organized if it is represented by at least 3 lobbyists and accounts for strictly more than one third of the total number of lobbyists in that industry.
